This note formulates a dynamic two-country (developed and developing countries) Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade with endogenous time preferences a la Uzawa (1968). We examine the relationship between initial factor endowment differences and trade patterns in the steady state. In particular, to highlight the integration of developing countries (e.g., China) into the world trading system, we concentrate on the case of asymmetric size of two countries (in terms of population). It will be shown that (i) given that the representative household in each country supplies * We are grateful to the Associate Editor and two annonymous referees for helpful com- 
Introduction
In recent decades, many developing countries have opened their economies to international trade. As an example, China's integration into the world economy is one of the most important developments affecting the structure and evolution of the global trading system at the dawn of the 21st century. How does the integration of developing countries into the world economy affect world trading patterns?
It seems to be very important to consider this problem in a dynamic HeckscherOhlin trade model. However, while the static Heckscher-Ohlin theorem holds even if preferences and technologies are slightly different among countries, the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin theorem under the assumption of exogenous time preference that was proved by Chen (1992) holds only if preferences and technologies are strictly identical among countries. In other words, under exogenous time preferences, at least one of the two countries should specialize in one of the two goods and it is very difficult to derive satisfactory results on trade patterns.
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The state of the art in dynamic trade theory is apparently unsatisfactory. This seems to suggest that the traditional focus on exogenous time preferences should be accompanied by a focus on endogenous time preferences. 2 Thus, we address the question of developing countries' integration in a dynamic Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin (CHO) model with endogenous time preferences a la Uzawa (1968) , in which there is a monopolistically competitive 'differentiated products' sector, and a perfectly competitive 'consumable capital' sector.
3 Consider the world economy as consisting of one developed country and one developing country. The developed country reached a steady state before the developing country (which corresponds to China) started the process of development (i.e., the removal of trade barriers). For simplicity, we call the former Home and the latter Foreign. Then China's decision to join the world trading system represents the opening of trade between Home and Foreign.
Kikuchi and Shimomura (2007) examine a similar problem using a dynamic two-country Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin model. 45 They assume, however, that both countries are endowed with an equal number of households. Thus the role of size differences in factor endowment is downplayed in the analyses. In the real world, there is a significant size difference between developed and developing countries. For example, China's population is 20 percent of the world population. To our knowledge, little attention has been given to the relationship between timing of development and the size of developing countries. Thus, it is important to consider the case of the asymmetric size of countries.
In this note, we extend the analysis of Kikuchi and Shimomura (2007) to the case of asymmetric size of two countries (in terms of population). We demonstrate that, given that the representative household in each country supplies an equal amount of labor, only intra-industry trade occurs in the steady state irrespective of differences in the number of representative households. Even if there country by two-factor by two-good Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) framework, which was extended and made popular by Helpman and Krugman (1985) , has led to the widely held belief that HO and Chamberlinian monopolistic competition are complementary in nature. 4 Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) examine a similar problem using a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model composed of a larger number of small open economies. 5 The literature on dynamic two-country models originated in Oniki and Uzawa (1965) .
While they assume exogenous saving rate in each trading country, most subsequent contributions, including Stiglitz (1970) , Chen (1992) , Shimomura (1992 Shimomura ( , 1993 Shimomura ( , 2004 ), Ventura (1997), Shimomura (2002, 2006) , assume that households maximize their discounted sum of utility, i.e., saving rates are endogenously determined. Chen, Nishimura and Shimomura (2005) discuss other major problems within dynamic HO models.
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is a larger amount of labor (in terms of population) in the developing country, due to catching-up by the developing country, sources of inter-industry trade based on differences in the capital-labor ratio vanish and only intra-industry trade occurs in the steady state.
This note is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a dynamic CHO model and Section 3 discusses the existence, uniqueness and local stability of the steady state. Section 4 derives trade-pattern propositions. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, Home and Foreign, that differ in their factor endowments. There are two types of commodities, differentiated products (Good 1) and a consumable capital (Good 2), produced using reproducible capital, k, and a primary and time-invariant factor of production, l (labor). The consumable capital can be either consumed as a non-durable good or added to the existing capital stock. Labor is measured in efficiency units.
Each Home (resp. Foreign) representative household supplies l (l * ) units of efficiency labor. The population of each country is assumed to be constant over time. The Home (resp. Foreign) population is m (resp. m * ). Thus, the Home (resp. Foreign) household is endowed with ml and mk (resp. m * l * and m * k * ) units of factors of production. Note that Kikuchi and Shimomura (2007) 's case corresponds to m = m * = 1.
Following the standard trade theory, we assume away international factor movements. Moreover, in order to focus on international trade, we assume that there is no international credit market, while there is a competitive domestic credit market in each country.
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Each consumer maximizes the discounted sum of utility.
where V is the quantity index for differentiated products, C 2 is the consumption of the consumable capital, and X ≡ exp{− t 0 ρ(u)dτ } is the discount factor at time t which depends on the past and present level of utility through the function ρ.
Following Uzawa (1968), we assume that the variable discount rate ρ(u)
It will be assumed that U is linearly homogeneous in its arguments and f
Quantity index V takes the following Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) form:
where N is the total number of differentiated products, x(i) is the consumption of the i-th variety of differentiated products, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Solving the static expenditure minimizing problem, we can define the expenditure function as
where the consumable capital serves as the numeraire, P ≡ N 0
is the price index for differentiated products, and ψ(u) is the inverse function of f , which clearly satisfies
Given that the equilibrium is symmetric, that is, p(i) = p and
we can obtain the following condition from the envelope theorem,
Assume that differentiated products are more capital-intensive than the consumable capital. 6 Differentiated products are produced by monopolistically competitive firms under increasing returns technology, while the consumable capital is produced by competitive firms under constant returns technology.
Assume that each firm in the differentiated products sector has the homothetic total cost function c 1 (w, r)φ(y), where y is the output level of each firm. There are significant economies of scale: φ(y)/y is decreasing over the relevant range of output levels y. The marginal revenue will be equated to the marginal cost:
7 Furthermore, free entry implies that price equals 6 This assumption is just for simplification and this capital intensity ranking itself does not alter the results of this paper. 7 We can obtain this relation as follows. Considering the subutility maximization problem:
, we obtain the inverse demand function of i-th variety as follows:
1/σ . Therefore, the revenue of the i-th firm is given by
and the first order condition,
average cost: p = [c 1 (w, r)φ(y)]/y. By combining these conditions, one can easily see that all varieties will have the same output levelȳ, which is defined
.
The constraints on labor and capital within Home are
where n is the number of differentiated products produced in Home and c 2 (w, r) and y 2 are the unit cost function and the output of the consumable capital, respectively.
Then, by defining ξ ≡ȳ/φ(ȳ), the zero-profit conditions can be written as
and we can obtain the factor price functions w(ξp) and r(ξp). Utilizing these factor price functions, the national income is shown as
The partial derivative of the national income with respect to the price of differ-8 This result depends crucially on homotheticity in production. See Dixit and Norman (1980, pp. 284-5) . To guarantee the existence and uniqueness ofȳ, we assume that φ satisfies
, and dθ φ dy < 0 for any positive y < ∞,
]. An example of φ(y) is ln(y + 1). 9 As it is clear from these equations, any country's population size does not affect its relative factor abundance in the static sense. Our aim is to check whether population size affects longrun capital accumulation.
8 entiated products, p, is equal to the aggregate national output of those products:
From (12), we can obtain another condition for each household:
Each household maximizes (1) subject to both (2) and (14). Associated with this problem is the Hamiltonian
where λ and δ are the shadow prices of k and X. The necessary conditions for optimality are
Letting Z ≡ λ/X and combining (2) and (17), we can obtaiṅ
Based on the foregoing argument, our dynamic general equilibrium two-9 country model is described aṡ
The system determines the equilibrium path of two state variables, k and k * , and eight jump variables, Z, Z * , δ, δ * , u, u * , p, and N .
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The steady state is the solution for the system of equations
For a given p, if
then there exists a unique and positive u such that
Let u(·) be the inverse function of ρ(·). 10 Since the shadow prices, Z, Z * , δ, δ * , are derived once the above system of equations determines p, k, k * , N , we see 10 As is clear from (32) and (33), u = u * holds at the steady state in which both countries are incompletely specialized.
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that the main system consists of the four equations:
Now, we can restate Kikuchi and Shimomura (2007)'s result.
Proposition 1: Suppose that differences in initial factor endowments between
Home and Foreign are not very large and that both the preference of each household and production technologies take the Cobb-Douglas form. Then there exists a unique steady state which is saddle-point stable. In the steady state both countries produce both goods.
Proof: See Appendix.
Trade-Pattern Propositions
Let us focus on the Home (gross) excess demand for differentiated products in the steady state,
Considering the steady-state Home budget constraint, (40), we obtain k = eψ − wl r .
11 As we will see later, even if ED 1 = 0 holds, there is an incentive for trade due to product differentiation. Thus, ED 1 (pED 1 ) can be interpreted as the Home gross excess demand for differentiated products (the Home excess supply of the consumable capital).
Substituting this into the Home excess demand and rearranging, we obtain the following condition:
where θ e ≡ [pe ′ N 1/(1−σ) /e], θ r ≡ (ξpr ′ /r), and θ w ≡ (ξpw ′ /w), respectively.
Following the same procedure, we can obtain the Foreign excess demand for differentiated products in the steady state, ED * 1 :
From these excess demand functions, we see that
Since differentiated products are assumed to be capital intensive,
holds. Let us examine the following two cases. (45)). Since demands have to add up to zero, this implies that both of them have to be zero and, therefore, there is no net trade (the value of imports equals the value of exports) in the differentiated products sector. This also implies that there is no incentive for inter-industry trade (i.e., the exchange of differentiated products for the consumable capital).
Still, since each country specializes in a different range of differentiated products, an incentive for intra-industry trade remains. We obtain our main proposition on the patterns of intra-industry trade. Again, in this case, Foreign's share of differentiated products in the world market becomes larger than Home's.
Concluding Remarks
Based on the two-sector Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin (CHO) framework, this note has formulated a dynamic model of international trade by introducing the Uzawa (1968) endogenous time preferences. Also, in contrast to Kikuchi and Shimomura (2007) , the difference in the number of households has been emphasized. We have shown that there exists a unique and saddlepoint-stable steady state that is independent of the initial international distribution of capital. In that steady state production in both countries is incompletely specialized Hopefully this analysis provides a useful paradigm for considering how the labor endowment of developing countries (e.g., China) works as a determinant of world trade patterns. Here, we shall prove the existence, uniqueness and stability of the steady state with incomplete specialization in the present two-country dynamic general equilibrium model. We shall focus on the symmetric case where preferences, technologies, and initial factor endowments are common between Home and Foreign (m = m * = 1, l = l * ). As we shall show later, the determinant of the Jacobian at a symmetrical steady state is not zero, which implies that as long as the international differences in those economic fundamentals are not very large, the existence, uniqueness and stability are guaranteed.
Existence
Let us consider the existence of the steady state. Since we assume l = l * , it is clear from (30)-(33) that k = k * holds at the steady state. Therefore, the system of equations which describes the steady-state k, p, and N becomes
From (47),
holds. Combining (48) − (49), one can obtain
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Substituting (50) into this, one can obtain
Multiplying p and rewriting this in terms of elasticity,
where θ e = [pe ′ N 1/(1−σ) /e], θ r = (ξpr ′ /r), and θ w = (ξpw ′ /w), respectively.
Rearranging this, we obtain:
where
, which is greater than 1.
Next, multiplying p to (49), one can obtain
Substituting (51) into (52), one can obtain
In terms of proportional change, we obtain the first relationship between N and p:
Since the differentiated products are capital-intensive, that is, θ w < 0, (54) implies that N is decreasing in p: we can depict (53) as Curve AA in Figure   1 .
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Now, let us turn to the other condition. From (51),
Let e −1 ≡ β, then we can obtain:
Rearranging this, one can obtain
In terms of proportional change, we obtain the second relationship between N and p.N p
Since θ ψ and θ ρ are positive, (56) implies that N is increasing in p: we can depict (55) as Curve BB in Figure   1 . 16 Based on the foregoing argument, one can conclude as follows.
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LEMMA A1: There uniquely exists a steady state in which production is incompletely specialized. Now, what remains to be argued concerning uniqueness is to exclude a steady state where at least one country is completely specialized. For this purpose, let us consider the whole GDP function. In the case where the differentiated products are more capital-intensive than the homogeneous good, it can be expressed as follows.
18
Making use of the above GDP function, we can express the steady-state Home 18 For the derivation of the monopolistically competitive industry's implicit production function, f 1 , see Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 139 ).
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and Foreign budget constraints as
If k > k * , then both
properties of the GDP function and vice versa. Thus, (57) and (58) together imply that there is no steady state such that k = k * holds. Therefore, we can conclude as follows.
LEMMA A2: When the two countries are sufficiently close in terms of factor endowment ratio, no country can specialize in producing only one good in the steady state.
Local Saddlepoint-Stability
Let us assume that the two countries are identical. Let us consider the Jacobian matrix of the steady state,
Denote the above matrix by J, and the corresponding eigenvalue as x. Then x is determined by the characteristic equation Ω(x) = |J − xI| = 0, where
Let us make the following calculations to obtain the above determinant.
First, let us add both the first row multiplied by ξr ′ /(ρ − x) and the second row multiplied by ξr ′ /(ρ − x) to the 9th row. Next, the 7th row minus the third row multiplied by eψ ′ /x, and the 8th row minus the 4th row multiplied by eψ ′ /x.
Finally, we add the 5th row multiplied by ρ ′ /(ρ − x) to the 7th row, and add the 6th row multiplied by ρ ′ /(ρ − x) to the 8th row. Then, we see that
When the first column is subtracted from the second column, we obtain where only the second term is negative, since the term, r ′′ k + w ′′ l, is positive due to the convexity of the GDP function with respect to p. Therefore, the term on x 3 becomes positive if σ is sufficiently large, which we assume. Therefore, there are two negative characteristic roots, i.e., x 3 and x 4 . Since there are two state variables, k and k * , it follows that the steady state is a saddle point.
LEMMA A3: When the two countries are sufficiently close, the steady state with both countries being incompletely specialized is locally saddlepoint-stable.
